A Behavioral Approach to SDG



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"Disaster Irrigation and Water Management towards Nexus (WEF) and
Sustainable Development Goals"

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Outline

- 1. Why are we "irrational" when it comes to sustainability?
- 2. Puzzles in environmental behavior: Why governments do nothing
- 3. How can we change policy making in order to achieve the SDGS?

Case: Embankments in Assam

"The Role of Narratives in Sociohydrological Models of Flood Behaviors" Leong (2017),

Water Resources Research

Apparent Irrationalities





Jakarta's Great Garuda flood wall





STRAITS TIMES GRAPHICS

How People Decide

- 1. System 1 "croc mind" rules us most times
- 2. Decision Making assumption: "open, full disclosure and information" – but brain is lazy
- 3. Rational and evidence-based but not how we decide.

Mental shortcuts

Heuristics/Biases/ We appeal to reason and "rationality"

System 1 and 2 in action: Decisions by doctors

SYSTEM 1

- Fast/automatic/easy
- Performs familiar or practiced routines
- · Fine for small talk
- Undemanding
- Can perform while tired, sick or
- Impressions/intuitions/feelings
- Susceptible to errors


SYSTEM 2

- Slow/effortful/hard
- · Necessary for novel decisions or routines
- Useful for harder questions
- Tiring/draining
- Impaired by fatigue, illness or
- Logic/analysis/reflection
- Can override errors through careful


Finding: A Higher Case Load leads to greater reliance on System 1

Applying behavioral economics to research physician decision-making ttps://www.quirks.com/articles/applying-behavioral-economics-to-research-physician-decision-making

Mexico Sinking



Bangkok Sinking





What is a behavioural approach?

- Psychology + Economics (limits to classical econs)
- 2. Incentives to change behavior
- 3. Something that governments have been using for a long time.

Recap #1: Why are we irrational?

How we think people decide vs how they *really* decide



"Irrationality"



What can governments do?

1. Nothing

Why bureaucrats do nothing when it comes to Sustainability

- · Risk calculus of costs and benefits for their actions
- Blame (-) Credit (+)

(Blame)	
	(Credit)

Three relationships:

- Considerations and ascriptions of credit and blame
- 'Credit and blame' and 'credit claiming and blame avoidance'
- 'Reactive ex-post' and 'anticipatory ex-ante avoidance and claims'



Risk, blame, credit

- Asymmetry in blame and credit worthiness and its ascription
 - Decision-making behaviour is more closely linked to the anticipation and avoidance of policy failures than to claiming credit (Risk of blame)
- Why so?
 - The act of coping itself may create a (false) sense of resilience, and may result in the withholding of blame if individuals are said to be responsible for their fates rather than policy-makers
 - Blame avoidance and credit claiming are related less to inherent human traits and personality quirks than they are functions of rational behaviour in given institutional contexts (ie System 1)




#2:Why governments do nothing I

Policy non-design: "Do nothing"

Policy	Outcomes	Processes	Inputs
Design	Instrumental package	Lasswellian formulation	Experience knowledge
Non-design	Static n-d space	Bargaining, trade- offs, log-rolling, venal, corrupt behaviour	Expectations of political gain, risk of blame, inaction





Protests over water- Bangalore



Bangalore, India

12 September 2016

Conflict over access to water from River Cauvery

Hundreds of pro- Karnataka activists staged protests on streets across the city following the Indian Supreme Court's order that 12,000 cusec of water from the River Cauvery to be released to Tamil Nadu for the next 10 days. Violent protesters burnt at-least two dozen vehicles bearing Tamil Nadu registration numbers and been set ablaze on different parts of the State

Credits: http://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/protests-over-water-in-southwestern-india-turn-violent-as-city-set-ablaze/50000262-3038345

Protests over water- São Paulo



São Paulo, Brazil

11 February 2015

Protest over lack of water during drought

Demonstrators protest over the lack of water in front of a riot police barricade at Paulista Avenue in Sao Paulo, Brazil on February 11, 2015. The state of Sao Paulo and its metropolitan region has been suffering its worst drought in 80 years

Credits: http://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/demonstrators-protest-over-the-lack-of-water-in-front-of-a-news-photo/463206688#demonstrators-protest-over-the-lack-of-water-in-front-of-a-riot-at-picture-id463206688

Protests over water- Ireland



Dublin, Ireland

10 December 2014

Protesting against government's plan to charge water

Tens of thousands of people poured into the streets of Dublin and other Irish cities on Wednesday in an angry protest against the government's plan to start billing for water and sewer service

Meantime, in Kathmandu...


Credits: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/environment/how-the-world-saw-ireland-s-water-charge-protests-1.2034326

Protests over water?



Kathmandu, Nepal

Residents lining up to get water from spouts



Credits

https://www.google.com.sg/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpurewatermovement.org%2Fclean-water-for-everyone%2F&bvm=bv.132479545,d.cGc&psig=AFQjCNE9ZI_AwvPBhl2Wb9QMTpi51Ue2wg&ust=1473999376289142

#2: Why governments do nothing II

How we think people decide vs how they *really* decide



"Irrationality"



Why governments do nothing I: Risk of blame

Why governments do nothing II: Paradox of social resilience (Adaptations)

Levee Effect

- 1. Over-reliance on embankments as flood control measure >>> flood-related fatalities when embankments failed (Osti and Nakasu [2014])
- 2. Even without levee failure, construction of levees *itself* can increase water surface elevations (Heine and Pinter, 2012].

Lack of adaptation in face of large but ultimately ineffective infrastructure = "levee effect"

- Di Baldassarre et al. [2015].


Adaptation Effect

"enhanced coping and adaptation capacities" gained by the community during earlier experience of flooding.

Reaction to small and frequent floods >>"adaptation effect"

[Penning-Rowsell, 1996; IPCC, 2012; Mechler and Bouwer, 2014]

Flood behavior



A systems understanding of flood behaviour, Newell and Wasson [2002]

Making sense of flood-risk behavior





Figure 2. Model of Flood Behaviour

Paradox of embankments



Field work



River embankments as flood management strategy

National Policy on Floods (1954) = building of embankments.

Between 1954 and 1990, length of embankments more than doubled.

Today, more than 5,000 km of embankments have been built in the Brahmaputra Valley.



Stone spurs were built as energy dissipators to protect embankments from scouring and erosion.

(Fieldwork April, Dec 2016)





Embankments have afforded some form of flood protection. Villages mushroomed around embankments, such as this village school.

But also susceptible to breaches.

Assam:

42 million hectares of land 98 million people affected

- 5 million hec agricultural lands destroyed
- > 1,700 human lives lost

Analysis

Four main narrative groups.

Main distinction between those with high social resilience (F3, 4, 6 and 8) and those who are more fragile (F1, 2, 5 and 7).

Resilience is based on two grounds.

The first group (4 and 6) which we call "Engineers" is characterized by informed views on infrastructure, with F4 recognizing that strong infrastructure can mitigate flood problems – strongly agreeing with statements such as:

"I think we suffered less from floods because of the embankments. (11)"

"In those parts of the state where lack of embankments is causing floods, construction of dykes should be expedited without any delay. (16)"

F6 meanwhile also takes an engineering perspective, arguing that poor infrastructure could lead to floods:

"Building embankments from all sides can not contain the river during floods. When river swells, the embankments will breach. (39)"

Method: Narratives

Q Method: Factor Analysis

- 1. help to identify the different narrative coalitions.
- 2. Q is not used in isolation, but to uncover a specific problem pointed out by Gober and Wheater [2015] on the empirical limits of Di Baldassarre et al. [2015] model
- 3. "condenses the variation of views, opinions and ideas into a set of basic positions, problem definitions or dimensions underlying the debate." van Eeten [2001]


Data:

- > 200 statements from newspapers in English, Nepalese: The Himalayan Times, The Kathmandu Post, as well as local videos and television channels and NGO sites. – redacted to 50
- 2. Tested on 50 villagers, men and women
- 3. The matrix was factor analyzed using the PQMETHOD software.
- eight principal component factors. Varimax rotation was used and resulted in eight identifiable factors.


- Factor 1: Unhappiness with Government efforts (Discontents)
- Factor 2: Complaints about current situation (Discontents)
- Factor 3: Use of Local knowledge (Hardened Preparers)
- Factor 4: Belief in Strong Infrastructure as Solution (Engineers)
- Factor 5: The Pessimists (Anger with Government for Poor Infrastructure)
- Factor 6: Diagnosis of Poor Infrastructure as Problem (Engineers)
- Factor 7: Anger with government The Pessimist (No target for blame, contra Discontents)
- Factor 8: Changed behaviour after floods The Hardened Preparer

Four narrative groups:

Engineer Pessimist Hardened adaptor Discontents



Modified System Dynamics



#3 Flood narratives as impetus for change

- 1. Empirical test of the social-hydrologic model.
- >> The framework is not just a binary one between levee effect and adaptation
- 2. Alterative paths as show in system dynamic diagram explanatory value of narratives
- 3. Policy implications:

Reduce reliance on small/frequent floods Increase cultivation of "engineers", demonstration effect in no-flood areas.

Takeaways

- 1. Why are we "irrational" when it comes to sustainability? System 1
- 2. Why governments do nothing: 1. Blame. 2. Paradox Resilience
- 3. How can we change policy making in order to achieve the SDGS? Powerful narratives

Handout: "The Role of Narratives in Sociohydrological Models of Flood Behaviors"

Thank you

- Collaborations welcome
- ching@nus.edu.sg

Thank you!



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Collaborations welcome ching@nus.edu.sg

Q factors

Factor Scores for factor 4		Factor								
Factor 4: The Engineers		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Statements (Original statement numbering in parentheses)										
1.	I think we suffered less from floods because of the embankments. (11)	2	2	2	2	0	2	-1	-1	
1.	In those parts of the state where lack of embankments is causing floods, construction of dykes should be expedited without any delay. (16)	0	0	1	2	-1	1	1	2	
1.	The government may not be able to stop nature's fury, but surely they can do lot more to prevent heavy death toll and damage to properties. (26)	1	1	2	2	0	-1	0	-2	
1.	Open fields and wetlands previously acting as water catchment areas are fast being filled by real estate construction escalating the problems of flooding each year. (33)	0	0	-2	2	0	1	0	0	
1.	All existing embankments along the Brahmaputra need to be strengthened to prevent flooding. (15)	2	1	1	2	1	2	-1	0	
1.	Mere short term measures like building temporary embankments are just not reliable. (21)	-2	-2	1	2	-1	0	1	-2	
1.	This river is our home; we know each and every current of it, their change in direction, behavior and so on. (50)	-2	-1	0	2	0	-1	0	0	

Factor 5: The Pessimists (No target for blame, contra Discontents)		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Statements (Original statement numbering in parentheses)									
	There is no government machinery to address aftermaths of such big disasters (floods). Minimum humanitarian assistance like food, drinking water, medicine is provided. (13)	0	0	0	0	2	1	-1	1
1.	The situation getting grim day by day with the government hardly taking any initiative in construction and maintenance of embankments. (14)	-1	-1	1	-1	2	1	1	0
1.	Government authorities are still beating round the bush without addressing the actual issue. (34)	2	0	0	0	2	-2	-1	1
1.	I feel defeated as a citizen of this country unheard by the political class. (42)	0	2	-2	-1	2	0	2	-1
1.	There is no end to our misery. Each year we are being reduced to beggars. (8)	1	-1	-2	-1	2	2	2	-1
1.	The administration seldom visits the areas to assess actual damage. (12)	1	1	2	1	2	-1	2	2
1.	Natural disasters have become intense and more damaging these days. (48)	-1	0	1	1	2	0	2	-1
1.	Every year we face the flood fury, but nothing changes. We are left to rebuild our lives all alone. (2)	2	1	2	0	2	0	1	0