

# The Effects of Migration on Collective Action in Irrigation: Evidence from Rural China

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# Motivation

- Extensive literature on collective action in the irrigation commons
- But little is known about effects of migration on collective action in irrigation







#### **Irrigation Collective Action**

- Araral, E. 2013. A Transaction Cost Approach to Climate Adaptation: Insights from Coase, Ostrom and Williamson and Evidence from the 400-year old Zangjeras. *Environmental Science* & Policy. 25:147-156
- Araral, E. 2013. Does geography matter to institutional choice? A comparative study of ancient commons. *Geoforum* 44: 224-231
- Araral, E, 2013. Ostrom, Hardin and the Commons. A Critical Appreciation and Revisionist View. *Environmental Science and Policy*. Volume 36, Pages 11-23
- Araral, E. (2011). The Impacts of Decentralization on Collective Action in Large Scale Commons. Water Alternatives. 4 (2): 110-123
- Araral, E. 2013. An institutional theory of robust socio-ecological systems: The case of the 2000 year-old Ifugao Society. *Human Ecology*. Volume 41, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 859-870
- Araral, E. (2011). The Impacts of Decentralization on Collective Action in Large Scale Commons. *Water Alternatives*. 4 (2): 110-123
- Araral, E. (2009). "What explains collective action in the commons? Theory with econometric results from the Philippines" *World Development,* Volume 37, Issue 3, March 2009, Pages 687-697

# **Findings**



- migration has a statistically significant negative effect on collective irrigation
- controlling for type of irrigation and theoretically relevant variables
- can partly explain decline in surface irrigation and increase of groundwater irrigation since the 1980s (from 2.5min 1980s to 5M in 2011)



# China as empirical case

- Urbanization 21% in 1982 to 56% in 2015
- → 278M rural to urban migrants by 2014
- Growth of ground water irrigation (40-70%)
- Double since 1980 (5M pumps in 2011)
- Drop in surface irrigation to 30% (WHY??)
- Irrigated land 50% of farmland
- 75% of grains / 90% of cash crops

# **Hypotheses**



- Migration has a negative effect on collective action in surface irrigation
- Affects village leadership, social capital and sense of community, economic heterogeneity and dependency on irrigation

#### Framework CONTEXT Physical Attributes Topography Village location Water Scarcity Community and Household attributes Collective Action Incentives Village Size Outcomes (household) of players Participation in Magnitude of collective migration maintenance / Inequality governance **Institutional Context** Quality of village governance Monitoring and sanctioning

## Data



- Survey in 2012 (household and village data)
- 1780 irrigation households
- 74 villages
- 18 provinces throughout China

Dependent variables		Definition	Expected sign
ODCA	Irrigation types: 0 2= well; 3=open ca		\
CLTMTN	Frequency of part collective mainten 1=normal; 0=seldo	\	
CLTMET	Frequency of attending village meetings related to irrigation: 2=often; 1=normal; 0=seldom or never		
Independent variables			
<b>Community attributes</b>			
LMIGRATION	The share of house migrants in total v		-
LMIGRATION2	The share of out-n proportion of villa population	O	-
LMIGRATION3	The share of out-n proportion of total	_	-
GINI	Gini index: village income inequality	•	-
TOTALHOUSE	Village size: the nu households	ımber of total	uncertain

Natural conditions		
TOPOGRAPHY	Plain=1 and 0 otherwise	+
LOCATION	Non-suburban village=1 and 0 otherwise	+
MIRRIGTSCAR	Moderate Water scarcity at village level=1 and 0 otherwise	+
SIRRIGTSCAR	Severe Water scarcity at village level=1 and 0 otherwise	-
Institutional arrange	ements	
VPAFAILURE	Village governance failure: 1 for petitions and conflicts, 0 otherwise	-
VSANCTION	Monitoring & sanctioning rules: 1 for imposing rules against free riders, 0 otherwise	+
Household character	ristics	
HLABOR	Household labor: percentage of labors in household	+
IGTSHORTAGE	Irrigation shortage history: 1=never; 5=frequent	-
IMPTSHORTAGE	Impact of insufficient irrigation: 1=bad impact and 0 otherwise	+
MDISTANCE	Middle distance to public irrigation	+
LGDISTANCE	Long distance of village to public irrigation	+/-
AGE	Age of household head	Uncertain
EDU	Education of household head	uncertain

Variables	Description	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dependent variable	N=1780				
ODCA	Different irrigation types(3=open canal)	1.79	1.21	0	3
Independent variable	es				
·	Percentage of households with out- migrants				
LMIGRATION		0.45	0.89	0	1
	Gini index on village level				
GINI		0.39	0.12	0.11	0.75
	Ln(Number of total households)				
TOTALHOUSE		5.83	1.05	2.30	7.56
	1= Plain; 0 otherwise				
TOPOGRAPHY	1=Non-suburban village; 0 otherwise	0.21	0.41	0	1
	1-1von-suburban vinage, o otherwise				
LOCATION	1=Modest Water scarcity; 0 otherwise	0.87	0.34	0	1
	1 Modest Water Scarcity, v other wise		0.40		
MIRRIGTSCAR	1=Severe Water Scarcity; 0 otherwise	0.43	0.49	0	1
	Severe water searchy, o otherwise	0.00	0.40	•	
SIRRIGTSCAR	1=petitions and conflicts; 0 otherwise	0.23	0.42	0	1
	petitions and conflicts, v other wise	0.40	0.50	0	
VPAFAILURE	1=rules existence; 0 otherwise	0.49	0.50	0	1
	Tales emistence, a outer wase	0.04	0.42	0	
VSANCTION	Percentage of labors in household	0.24	0.43	0	1
	a creatings or insore in nouseness.	0.62	0.25	0	
HLABOR	1=never; 5=frequent	0.62	0.25	0	1
I CTCH OPTH CE	,	2.24	1.18	1	=
IGTSHORTAGE	1=bad impact; 0 otherwise	2.24	1.18	1	5
IMPECHAPITA CE	<b>T</b>	0.78	0.42	0	1
IMPTSHORTAGE	1=middle distance; 0 otherwise	0./8	0.42	U	1
MDICTANCE		0.32	0.47	0	1
MDISTANCE	1=long distance; 0 otherwise	0.32	U.4 /	0	1
LODICTANCE	<u> </u>	0.15	0.36	0.00	1
LGDISTANCE	Age of household head (years)	0.15	0.36	0.00	1

	Rain-fed	Lift	Well	Canal
Migration:				
LMIGRATION=HIGH	40.92	22.99	7.37	28.74
LMIGRATION=LOW	16.39	17.02	20.45	46.14
Natural conditions:				
TOPOGRAPHY=1	6.23	13.03	39.38	41.36
TOPOGRAPHY=0	26.85	19.96	11.37	41.82
MIRRIGTSCAR=1	14.81	21.74	13.72	49.73
SIRRIGTSCAR=1	31.01	21.88	18.75	28.37

Institution arrangements:	Rainfed	Lift	Well	Canal
VPAFAILURE=1	27.19	17.96	17.72	37.13
VPAFAILURE=0	18.27	19.07	16.57	46.08
VSANCTION=1	14.46	21.32	19.85	44.36
VSANCTION=0	25.15	17.66	16.28	40.9
Household characteristics:				
IGTSHORTAGE=SEL DOM	15.92	19.42	15.73	48.93
IGTSHORTAGE=OFT EN	32.65	17.2	19.24	30.9
IMPTSHORTAGE=1	23.37	17.98	17.45	41.2
IMPTSHORTAGE=0	19.95	20.47	16.01	43.57
MDISTANCE=0	27.73	18.26	17.23	36.78
MDISTANCE=1	11.89	19.1	16.94	52.07
LGDISTANCE=1	15.69	25.49	9.8	49.02

ODCA	Different irrigation types(3-open canal)	1.79	1.21	0	
Independent variab	les				
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LOCATION	1=Non-suburban village; 0 otherwise	0.87	0.34	0	
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SIRRIGTSCAR	1=Severe Water Scarcity; 0 otherwise	0.23	0.42	0	
VPAFAILURE	1-petitions and conflicts; 0 otherwise	0.49	0.50	0	
VSANCTION	1=rules existence; 0 otherwise	0.24	0.43	0	
HLABOR	Percentage of labors in household	0.62	0.25	0	
IGTSHORTAGE	I=never; 5=frequent	2.24	1.18	1	
IMPTSHORTAGE	1=bad impact; 0 otherwise	0.78	0.42	0	
MDISTANCE	1=middle distance; 0 otherwise	0.32	0.47	0	
LGDISTANCE	I-long distance; 0 otherwise	0.15	0.36	0.00	
ACE	Les of homebold head (seven)	47.41	12.02	1.5	

Table 3. Irrigation type distribution of different group

	Rain-fed	Lift	Well	Canal
Migration:				
LMIGRATION-HIGH	40.92	22.99	7.37	28.74
LMIGRATION-LOW	16.39	17.02	20.45	46.14
Natural conditions:				
TOPOGRAPHY-1	6.23	13.03	39.38	41.36
TOPOGRAPHY-0	26.85	19.96	11.37	41.82
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IMPTSHORTAGE=0	19.95	20.47	16.01	43.57
MDISTANCE=0	27.73	18.26	17.23	36.78
MDISTANCE-1	11.89	19.1	16.94	52.07
LGDISTANCE-1	15.69	25.49	9.8	49.02

	Dep.=ordered collective irrigation (ODCA)				
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
LMIGRATION	-0.133***	-0.191***	-0.187***	-0.188***	
	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	
Other community attributes:					
GINI	-1.493***	-1.516***	-1.489***	-1.566***	
TOTALHOUSE	0.163***	0.182***	0.180***	0.171***	
Natural conditions:					
TOPOLOGY	0.420***	0.601***	0.599***	0.613***	
	(0.071)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.102)	
LOCATION	0.067	0.160	0.167*	0.196*	
	(0.087)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.102)	
MIRRIGTSCAR	0.352***	0.236***	0.221***	0.146*	
	(0.058)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.087)	
SIRRIGTSCAR				-0.137	

Institution arrangements:				
VPAFAILURE	-0.256***	-0.157**	-0.152**	-0.140**
	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.064)
VSANCTION	0.167**	0.171**	0.160**	0.170**
	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Household characteristics:				
HLABOR	0.410***	0.196*	0.206*	0.207*
	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.114)
IGTSHORTAGE	-0.190***	-0.140***	-0.143***	-0.138***
IMPTSHORTAGE	0.068	0.094	0.096	0.092
MDISTANCE	0.447***	0.386***	0.448***	0.451***
AGE	0.002	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.006**
EDU	-0.010	-0.017*	-0.017*	-0.018*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
LGDISTANCE			0.244***	0.246***

Dep.=ordered collective irrigation maintenance						
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	margins		
-0.228**	-0.218**	-0.264**	-0.261*	0.055*		
nics controls:						
-0.123	-0.157	-0.187	-0.253*	0.053*		
-0.395**	-0.415**	-0.388**	-0.397*	0.083*		
controls:						
0.154	0.352	0.198	0.143	-0.030		
-1.231***	-1.277***	-1.368***	-1.183***	0.249***		
0.275	0.332	0.390	0.189	-0.040		
stitution setup:						
-0.506**	-0.520**	-0.578**	-0.483*	0.102*		
-0.353	-0.347	-0.335	-0.051	0.011		
Provincial water endowment controls:						
	0.165	0.352*	14.594	-3.068		
	-0.228** nics controls: -0.123 -0.395** controls: 0.154 -1.231*** 0.275 stitution setup: -0.506** -0.353	(1) (2) -0.228** -0.218**  nics controls: -0.123 -0.157 -0.395** -0.415**  controls: 0.154 0.352 -1.231*** -1.277*** 0.275 0.332  stitution setup: -0.506** -0.520** -0.353 -0.347  dowment controls:	(1) (2) (3) -0.228** -0.218** -0.264**  nics controls:  -0.123 -0.157 -0.187 -0.395** -0.415** -0.388**  controls:  0.154 0.352 0.198 -1.231*** -1.277*** -1.368***  0.275 0.332 0.390  stitution setup:  -0.506** -0.520** -0.578** -0.353 -0.347 -0.335  dowment controls:	(1) (2) (3) (4)  -0.228** -0.218** -0.264** -0.261*  nics controls:  -0.123 -0.157 -0.187 -0.253*  -0.395** -0.415** -0.388** -0.397*  controls:  0.154 0.352 0.198 0.143  -1.231*** -1.277*** -1.368*** -1.183***  0.275 0.332 0.390 0.189  citiution setup:  -0.506** -0.520** -0.578** -0.483*  -0.353 -0.347 -0.335 -0.051  dowment controls:		

## Conclusion

- migration has a statistically significant negative effect on collective irrigation
- controlling for type of irrigation and theoretically relevant variables
- can partly explain decline in surface irrigation and increase of groundwater irrigation since the 1980s (from 2.5min 1980s to 5M in 2011)

- but effects mediated through leadership, social capital, sense of community, economic heterogeneity, and dependence on resources
- Also mediated by proximity to urban centers or towns, increased inequality, lower levels of household labor, topography, water shortages.

## Limitations

- Not panel data
- positive effects of migration on collective action have been omitted in the survey, e.g. remittances could be used to support local schools, culture, infrastructure, or in general human capital





Thank you

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